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RECONSIDERING INDIRECT-PURCHASER CLASS ACTIONS
Stephen Carr*
Abstract
Few issues have proven more vexing to private antitrust enforcement
than those related to indirect-purchaser class actions. The current dual
system of enforcement—federal and state—exacerbates the difficulty of
litigating indirect-purchaser claims by layering procedural complexity
on top of substantive complexity and by explicitly allowing (perhaps
even incentivizing) duplicative recovery. Almost all commentators are
in substantial agreement that reform is necessary, but Congress appears
unlikely to take action on the issue in the near future. This Note
proposes a procedural solution that would consolidate litigation in a
single federal court based on the limited-fund class action model of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B). Under the limited-fund
model, the purpose of consolidated litigation is to determine liability
before turning to the apportionment of damages. This Note also
advocates for a presumption that damages are appropriately allocated to
purchasers on a pro rata basis, consistent with common practice in the
limited-fund class action context. Proper allocation would depend on
the purchaser’s position in the supply chain, with direct purchasers
receiving the largest share of the recovery. This Note’s proposal
provides three primary advantages: (1) it eliminates the possibility of
duplicative litigation; (2) it aligns the interests of all the potential
plaintiffs to better incentivize vigorous antitrust enforcement; and (3) it
reduces the need for complex damages calculations.
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INTRODUCTION
We are all victims of antitrust violations—the goods and services
that we purchase every day are more expensive than they would
otherwise be in the absence of anticompetitive conduct.1 Even
consumers who never purchase products directly from price-fixing
companies or illegal monopolies have paid supracompetitive prices,
either for goods whose prices were manipulated higher up the supply
chain, or through increased prices of component parts or ingredients.2
For decades, antitrust scholars, lawmakers, and judges have been
divided over the wisdom of providing indirect purchasers standing to
assert claims under the antitrust laws versus reserving the exclusive
right to sue for direct purchasers.3 While current federal law prohibits
1. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 17–20 (2005).
Anticompetitive conduct can refer to a wide variety of practices, from large cartels joining
together to fix prices to single firms abusing their monopoly power.
2. For an economic analysis of the extent to which price fixing harms purchasers beyond
merely increasing prices for units purchased, see Leonardo J. Basso & Thomas W. Ross,
Measuring the True Harm from Price-Fixing to Both Direct and Indirect Purchasers, 58 J.
INDUST. ECON. 895, 897 (2010).
3. For an early scholarly debate in the aftermath of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977), compare William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers
Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois
Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1979) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Indirect Purchaser
Standing], and William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A
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indirect-purchaser suits, state law in many jurisdictions, which
otherwise closely mirrors federal law, grants indirect purchasers
standing; alternatively, indirect purchasers may bring claims under other
provisions of their state’s consumer protection laws or under theories of
unjust enrichment.4
Nearly all commentators agree that the current private enforcement
regime—allowing indirect-purchaser suits in certain states but not
others and sometimes in federal court though never under federal law—
is overly complex and needlessly duplicative.5 In 2007, the Antitrust
Modernization Commission, a committee of twelve antitrust experts
established by Congress “to examine whether the need exists to
modernize the antitrust laws and to identify and study related issues,”
endorsed legislative reform proposals to grant indirect purchasers
standing under federal law and to consolidate litigation in a single
forum.6 However, the Commission’s recommendation seems unlikely to
become law, and it would do little to address the difficulty of
apportioning damages or clarifying issues of class-action certification.7

Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1274 (1980), with Robert G. Harris &
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy
Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269 (1979). Direct purchasers are parties who purchase a good
from the defendant. Indirect purchasers are parties who have purchased a product at some point
further down the supply chain (e.g., customers at the retail level when those at the
manufacturing level fixed the prices) or as a component of a larger product (e.g., one component
part in a finished automobile). For a general overview of the rule of Illinois Brick and the
various state-level responses, see AM. BAR ASS’N, INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK
(2007) [hereinafter INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK].
4. For more on consumer protection and unjust enrichment theories, see INDIRECT
PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 48–58. For a comprehensive overview of
indirect-purchaser actions in every state, including causes of action that are the functional
equivalent of indirect-purchaser actions, see AM. BAR ASS’N, INDIRECT PURCHASER LAWSUITS: A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Eric J. McCarthy, Gregory S. Seador & Charles R. Price eds., 2010).
5. See, e.g., William H. Page, Class Interpleader: The Antitrust Modernization
Commission’s Recommendation to Overrule Illinois Brick, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 725, 725
(2008) (noting that nearly all informed observers have “concluded that indirect purchaser
litigation in the United States is unnecessarily costly and does not serve a sensible antitrust
policy”). The perceived irrationality of enforcement is not a new phenomenon. E.g., HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 190 (1973) (“If Mars had antitrust laws, a
visitor from that planet would surely regard the variety of methods we use for enforcing ours as
beyond rational comprehension.”). For a thorough criticism of the current state of indirectpurchaser litigation as failing both to adequately compensate victims and to optimally deter
violations, see John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Consumer
Interest, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 531, 535 (2003).
6. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at vi–vii, 1,
A.65–67 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_
report.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. For a criticism of the Commission’s proposal to grant indirect purchasers standing, see
Page, supra note 5. In fairness to the Commission, a proposal addressing issues of procedural
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This Note suggests a different approach—certifying indirect-purchaser
class action suits along the lines of limited-fund class action suits
created by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B)—based on the
goals of limiting duplicative litigation, encouraging vigorous
enforcement, and simplifying complex questions of damages
calculations.8
Limited-fund class actions resemble the traditional procedural
devices of joinder and interpleader in that they reduce the possibility of
wasteful, duplicative litigation, by consolidating litigation in a single
forum to clarify parties’ rights and obligations.9 In general, limited-fund
class actions require mandatory participation to avoid free-rider
problems10 and incentivize optimal investment in private enforcement.11
The history of class actions, like the history of procedural law generally,
is rife with examples of courts and commentators adapting an ostensibly
procedural device to achieve substantive goals.12 Applying the limitedfund model to indirect-purchaser class actions could provide an
law would have exceeded its mandate. See INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra
note 3, at 8–11.
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). In practice, most antitrust plaintiffs bring suit as class
actions due to the high cost of litigation and the often relatively small harm suffered by
individual plaintiffs. For example, a 2008 study of forty antitrust private actions found that
plaintiffs brought all but six suits as class actions. See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis,
Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879,
901 (2008).
9. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:16 (5th ed. 2014)
(“All claimants interested in the fund in such proceedings must litigate their claims in that
aggregate proceeding.”). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (permitting class action treatment
when “prosecuting separate actions . . . would create a risk of . . . adjudications with respect to
individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the
other members . . . or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i) (“A person . . . must be joined as a party
if . . . that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or impede
the person’s ability to protect the interest . . . .”), and FED. R. CIV. P. 22(a)(1) (“Persons with
claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability may be joined as defendants
and required to interplead.”).
10. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
11. For an argument for the advantages of mandatory participation in class actions, see
David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in REGULATION THROUGH
LITIGATION 244 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Regulatory Advantage]. For
the contrasting view, see Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the New
Millennium and the Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177.
12. For an interesting history of the modern class action and an argument that the drafters
of the 1966 amendments, which created the modern version of Rule 23 and the three categories
of class action, meant to use the procedure to accomplish the substantive goal of facilitating civil
rights class actions, see David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its
Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011). For a historical analysis,
going back to the medieval period, of the ways group litigation has evolved alongside notions of
individuality and collectivity, see generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP
LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
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opportunity for courts and litigators to improve antitrust enforcement
and mitigate some of the inherent difficulties in litigating actions
potentially involving thousands of victims who have collectively
suffered an enormous harm but are individually entitled to relatively
small damages.
This Note proceeds in three Parts, the first of which examines the
development of federal and state law governing antitrust standing for
direct and indirect purchasers. The second Part discusses the history of
limited-fund class actions and related practical class-action issues. The
third Part considers the advantages of limited-fund class action
treatment in the antitrust context and further explains the rationale for
using this framework in indirect-purchaser class actions.
I. INDIRECT-PURCHASER STANDING
The question of standing addresses whether the particular plaintiff
before the court is the correct person to bring suit.13 Federal courts have
recognized both prudential limits on standing—limits that Congress
ought to be able to alter or overcome—and constitutional limits based
on the federal courts’ Article III powers.14 While the Clayton Act,
which forms the basis for most private actions seeking treble damages
for violations of antitrust laws, grants a cause of action to “any person”
injured by such violations,15 the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois16 has limited standing to direct purchasers.17 The
13. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3 (5th ed. 2007); see also
INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 29–33 (discussing standing for
indirect purchasers).
14. Article III extends the judicial powers to all cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. For a discussion of various prudential limitations on standing, see CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 13, §§ 2.3.4–.3.6. State legislatures and judiciaries should also be able to extend standing
beyond the prudential limitations created by the federal judiciary, as they have in the context of
indirect-purchaser lawsuits. In the class action context, courts usually treat the representative
plaintiff’s standing to sue as an implicit requirement for certification. Linda S. Mullenix,
Standing and Other Dispositive Motions After Amchem and Ortiz: The Problem of “Logically
Antecedent” Inquiries, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 703, 705.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
16. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
17. Id. at 746–48. Subsequent decisions have recognized technical exceptions to the rule
from Illinois Brick, such as when direct purchasers conspire with manufacturers, yet the
narrowness of these exceptions has tended to reinforce the power of the rule. See INDIRECT
PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 11–25. Recently, the Supreme Court of
Canada approved standing for indirect purchasers. See Mark Katz & Chantelle Spagnola, Green
Light for Indirect Purchaser Claims in Canada, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Dec. 17, 2013), https://
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/green-light-for-indirect-purchaser-claims-in-canada/.
Similarly, Japan provides standing for indirect purchasers. See SIMON VANDE WALLE, PRIVATE
ANTITRUST LITIGATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN 61–62 (2013). The countries in the
European Union generally grant indirect purchasers standing as well. Id. at 174–75. Both Japan
and the European Union also generally allow price-fixers to assert a pass-on offense—price-
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Court’s rationale rests on a desire to limit the scope of antitrust
remedies and thus improve antitrust enforcement.18 Most interpreters
agree, or assume, that the rule from Illinois Brick is merely a prudential
limitation that Congress or state lawmakers can amend or overrule.19 In
California v. ARC America Corp.,20 the Court backed away from any
strict ban on indirect-purchaser standing in federal courts by refusing to
preempt state-based causes of action for indirect purchasers; instead, it
held that state courts could adjudicate these claims without undermining
the purposes of the federal antitrust scheme.21
The following Sections discuss the history and decision-making
surrounding indirect-purchaser standing. The difficulties in reconciling
the Court’s precedents in Illinois Brick and ARC America help explain
the current confusion in this area and suggest that reform is necessary.22
A. A History of Indirect-Purchaser Standing Under Federal Law
The Court decided Illinois Brick at a time when antitrust policy was
undergoing an important shift from a progressive ideology, skeptical of
big business and inclined to see a wide variety of violations, to a more
business friendly approach driven by neoclassical economic reasoning
and optimized by the so-called Chicago School of Antitrust.23 The
Chicago School attempted to move antitrust enforcement away from
formalistic characterizations of certain per se offenses toward a more
nuanced, fact-specific analysis.24 This fact-specific inquiry required
judges to balance competitive harms against cooperative benefits and
fixers can avoid damages by claiming that the direct purchaser passed on the overcharge to the
indirect purchasers. Id. at 61, 174. However, opt-out class actions are generally far less common
in Japan and the European Union than in the United States. Id. at 63, 177.
18. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 740–46 (noting evidentiary burdens and reduced incentives for
direct purchasers to prosecute); see also Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars Episode I:
Illinois Brick from Inside the Supreme Court, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 553, 554 (2005)
[hereinafter Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars] (“In short, the Court believed [indirect-purchaser
standing] would make for bad antitrust remedial policy.”).
19. For a discussion of the various federal and state attempts to modify the rule of Illinois
Brick, see INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 5–8, 26–28.
20. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
21. For a discussion of Illinois Brick and ARC America, see Ronald W. Davis, Indirect
Purchaser Litigation: ARC America’s Chickens Come Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick
Wall, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (1997). The difficulty in reconciling these two decisions has
probably contributed to the perception that overruling Illinois Brick may still be a possibility,
albeit an unlikely one.
22. For an enlightening history of the four most important Supreme Court decisions on
indirect-purchaser standing—the so-called “Illinois Brick quartet” of Hanover Shoe, Illinois
Brick, ARC America, and UtiliCorp United—from which much of this Part is drawn, see Gavil,
Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 563–74.
23. See id. at 557–63 (noting the larger ideological shifts occurring within the Court and
within antitrust enforcement driven by “the confluence of many political, historical, and
intellectual factors”).
24. See id. For more on the evolution of antitrust ideology and approaches to the antitrust
rules, see generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 31–56.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/17

6

Carr: Reconsidering Indirect-Purchaser Class Actions

2015]

RECONSIDERING INDIRECT-PURCHASER CLASS ACTIONS

919

was either implicitly or explicitly concerned with limiting potential false
positives that might chill otherwise economically efficient behavior.25
The courts often characterized the new mode of analysis as a “rule of
reason” and tended to focus on concepts of consumer welfare and
economic efficiency.26
Given the influence of the Chicago School and its emphasis on
nuanced standards as opposed to per se rules, it was surprising to see the
Court adopt a new per se ban on indirect-purchaser standing in Illinois
Brick.27 However, at the same time that the Court was attempting to
expand rule-of-reason analysis, it was also seeking to limit the scope of
the treble damages private right of action.28 Perhaps with this goal in
mind, the Court saw in Illinois Brick an opportunity to limit the number
of potential plaintiffs and the range of issues presented when calculating
damages by denying standing to indirect purchasers, a potentially large
and litigious group.29
1. Illinois Brick and Offensive and Defensive Pass-On
Prior to Illinois Brick, defendants were more likely than plaintiffs to
raise the issue of pass-on. Defendants argued that they should not be
liable for antitrust damages to direct purchasers who had “passed on”
the overcharge to their customers, the indirect purchasers.30 In Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,31 the Court denied the use
25. For a discussion of the importance of the Chicago School in establishing a dominant
role for economics in antitrust law, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at vii–xi (2d ed.
2001).
26. For the difference between the per se and rule-of-reason analyses, see id. at 39.
27. See Andrew I. Gavil, Thinking Outside the Illinois Brick Box: A Proposal for Reform,
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 189 (2009) [hereinafter Gavil, Proposal for Reform] (“Foremost,
Illinois Brick suffers from the same infirmity as all per se rules. It categorically assumes that
pass on ‘always or almost always’ will be impossible to measure. If that is not the case, the per
se rule in Illinois Brick will under-deter.”).
28. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 554–55; see, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (holding that to recover treble damages
under the Clayton Act, the plaintiff “must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants’ acts unlawful”). Treble damages, while imprecise, are theoretically justified by the
need to compensate for undetected violations—if violators only paid actual damages, violations
would have no penalty, and firms could profit from their violations without cost. See Gavil,
Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 603.
29. See, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732, 734–35 (1977) (arguing that
concentrating enforcement in a smaller group of potential plaintiffs with fewer evidentiary
issues will improve enforcement).
30. The economics of “pass-on” can be complicated and often depend on the specific
conditions of the relevant market at the time of price-fixing, including elasticity of demand and
the amount of competition at the retail level. See, e.g., Fei Deng, John H. Johnson & Gregory K.
Leonard, Economic Analysis in Indirect Purchaser Class Actions, 26 ANTITRUST 51, 53 (2011).
31. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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of pass-on as a defense.32 The manufacturer defendant argued that the
direct-purchaser plaintiff, a retailer, had not suffered antitrust injury
because it had passed on any overcharge to its customers, the indirect
purchasers.33 Both the district court and the appellate court rejected the
pass-on defense, and the Supreme Court affirmed.34 The Court noted
that, as a general principle, even if the direct purchaser can pass on the
overcharge, either the reduction in demand for its product at the higher
price or the increased profits it would have gained at the lower price
will still injure the direct purchaser to some extent.35 The defendant
argued that, under certain economic conditions, the direct purchaser
could pass on all of the overcharge and maintain its profits.36 The Court
reasoned, however, that the complex economic analysis required to
determine whether such conditions were present, and if they were
present, how much of the overcharge was actually passed on, was
beyond the capabilities of the federal courts.37 Additionally, the Court
worried that if defensive pass-on could defeat recovery for direct
purchasers, then indirect purchasers would fail to make up the
difference because they have a much smaller incentive to prosecute
antitrust violations since courts would limit their damages to the
relatively small overcharge from a single purchase, a tiny slice of the
total antitrust injury.38
Illinois Brick, however, presented the Court with the opposite
situation—a plaintiff attempting to use pass-on offensively for
32. Id. at 488. The order in which the Court addressed the cases—first considering
defensive pass-on in Hanover Shoe before offensive pass-on in Illinois Brick—certainly framed
the issues for the Justices in a particular way and may have been critical to the holding in Illinois
Brick:
I think the plaintiffs-respondents in this case, which they now have lost, are the
victims of an unhappy chronology. If Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp. had not preceded this case, and were it not “on the books,” I
am positive that the Court today would be affirming, perhaps unanimously, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. The policy behind the Antitrust Acts and all
the signs point in that direction, and a conclusion in favor of indirect purchasers
who could demonstrate injury would almost be compelled.
Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
33. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 487–88.
34. Id. at 488.
35. Id. at 489–91 (“We hold that the buyer is equally entitled to damages if he raises the
price for his own product. As long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes
from the buyer more than the law allows.”).
36. Id. at 491–92; see also Deng, Johnson & Leonard, supra note 30, at 52–54 (explaining
the textbook model of 100% pass-on and noting the model’s limited real-world value).
37. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 492–93 (“A wide range of factors influence a company’s
pricing policies. Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be
measured after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact been
different . . . , he would have chosen a different price.”).
38. Id. at 494. It’s worth noting that the Court decided Hanover Shoe when modern class
action practice was still in its earliest stages. Marcus, supra note 12, at 660–61.
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recovery.39 The State of Illinois, acting on behalf of itself and local
governmental entities, sued Illinois Brick Company for treble damages,
alleging that the brick manufacturer conspired to increase the price of
bricks it sold to masons, who passed the overcharge to general
contractors, who then passed the overcharge to the end consumer of
bricks—the State of Illinois.40 Therefore, the State of Illinois was two
levels of distribution removed from the alleged price-fixing.41 The
district court dismissed the claim on summary judgment because the
State of Illinois was an indirect purchaser, but the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed.42
The Supreme Court framed its final decision as a choice between
three options: (1) overrule Hanover Shoe and allow for offensive and
defensive use of pass-on; (2) reinforce Hanover Shoe and strictly
prohibit both offensive and defensive pass-on; or (3) apply Hanover
Shoe asymmetrically—allow for offensive but not defensive pass-on.43
The Court chose the second option—a total bar on the use of passon44—in part because the economic evidence required to establish passon to the indirect purchaser would be the same in both offensive and
defensive pass-on.45 The Court determined that, in both contexts, passon would require complex, detailed analysis regarding how a change in
a single price input affected the final price.46 This task might be even
more complicated in the indirect-purchaser context because courts
would potentially have to apportion damages at more than one level, as
in Illinois Brick where Illinois was two levels removed from the alleged
conspiracy.47 The Court did not wish to further complicate the “already
39. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977).
40. Id. at 726–27.
41. Id. at 726. Illinois alleged that the total price-fixing conspiracy resulted in a $3 million
overcharge to the State and local governments. Id. at 727.
42. Id. at 727–28.
43. Id. at 729–36; see also Davis, supra note 21, at 387–88. Additionally, the Court might
have characterized the sale as essentially a cost-plus agreement because the State had to pay the
cost of the bricks, or the Court might have adopted a more nuanced standard and avoided a per
se rule of standing. See Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 587, 589 (citing five
options Justice Lewis Powell’s clerk presented to him).
44. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 731 (“[T]he reasoning of Hanover Shoe cannot justify unequal
treatment of plaintiffs and defendants with respect to the permissibility of pass-on arguments.”);
id. at 736 (“We are left, then, with two alternatives: either we must overrule Hanover
Shoe . . . , or we must preclude respondents from seeking to recover on their pass-on theory. We
choose the latter course.”).
45. Id. at 732.
46. Id. (“However ‘long and complicated’ the proceedings would be when defendants
sought to prove pass-on, . . . they would be equally so when the same evidence was introduced
by plaintiffs.”).
47. Id. at 732–33 (“The demonstration of how much of the overcharge was passed on by
the first purchaser must be repeated at each point at which the price-fixed goods changed hands
before they reached the plaintiff.”).
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protracted treble-damages proceedings” by adding additional layers of
analysis.48
The Court also relied on two additional factors: (1) the need for
evenhandedness in applying the pass-on theory,49 and (2) the risk of
multiple liabilities.50 The evenhandedness argument was based on a
belief that the same rules should apply to defendants seeking to escape
liability and plaintiffs trying to establish liability.51 In his dissent,
Justice William Brennan criticized concern for evenhandedness and
focused on the policies underlying the decision in Hanover Shoe, noting
the following:
The interests at stake in “offensive” passing-on cases,
where the indirect purchasers sue for damages for their
injuries, are simply not the same as the interests at stake in
the Hanover Shoe, or “defensive” passing-on situation.
There is no danger in this case, for example, as there was in
Hanover Shoe, that the defendant will escape liability and
frustrate the objectives of the treble-damages action.52
Additionally, the Court insisted that “allowing offensive but not
defensive use of pass-on would create a serious risk of multiple liability
for defendants” because federal law allows direct purchasers to sue for
the entire overcharge.53 If the direct purchaser succeeded in suing for
the entire overcharge and the indirect purchaser prevailed as well, the
defendant would pay double the appropriate amount of damages.54
Finally, the Court maintained that direct-purchaser suits for treble
damages most effectively enforced antitrust laws.55 The Court reasoned
that direct purchasers would have the greatest incentive to enforce the
48. Id. at 732.
49. See Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 596–605 (discussing the evolving
views of the Justices and the importance of evenhandedness and symmetry).
50. Id. at 582–85 (discussing Justice Harry Blackmun’s and Justice Powell’s proposed
options regarding whether to allow offensive pass-on and the possible problems of double
recovery).
51. Id. at 602 & n.284.
52. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 730 (majority opinion).
54. Id. (“The risk of duplicative recoveries created by unequal application of the Hanover
Shoe rule is much more substantial than in the more usual situation where the defendant is sued
in two different lawsuits by plaintiffs asserting conflicting claims to the same fund.”). For a
legal argument that multiple recoveries never exist in practice, see Robert H. Lande, Why
Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 329 (2004) [hereinafter
Lande, Antitrust Damage Levels]. For an economic argument that courts understate overcharge
damages, see Basso & Ross, supra note 2.
55. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 734–35 (“[W]e understand Hanover Shoe as resting on the
judgment that the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full
recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff
potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed by
it.”).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/17

10

Carr: Reconsidering Indirect-Purchaser Class Actions

2015]

RECONSIDERING INDIRECT-PURCHASER CLASS ACTIONS

923

law, while litigation over the allocation of damages between different
levels of purchasers within the supply chain would not greatly improve
enforcement.56 Indirect purchasers would often suffer damages so small
that “only a small fraction would be likely to come forward to collect
their damages.”57 Thus, the Court established a per se rule denying
indirect purchasers standing to sue for treble damages.58
2. Reaction to the Rule of Illinois Brick
While scholars and judges associated with the Chicago School
approved of the decision in Illinois Brick,59 consumer advocates
criticized the decision for overcompensating intermediate parties at the
expense of consumers and for ignoring congressional intent.60 Not long
before the Court decided Illinois Brick, Congress passed the Hart–
Scott–Robino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976,61 which authorized
states to bring parens patriae actions on behalf of indirect purchasers in
their states.62 Although the majority minimized the importance of the
Hart–Scott–Robino Act by characterizing it as mere procedural
litigation, it seemed clear to the dissent that Congress passed the Act
with the belief that indirect purchasers would have standing under the
antitrust laws.63 The dissent argued that the majority’s treatment of
congressional intent appeared self-serving.64
56. Id. at 746–47 (“[W]e question the extent to which such an attempt [to apportion
damages between direct and indirect purchasers] would make individual victims whole for
actual injuries suffered rather than simply depleting the overall recovery in litigation over passon issues.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57. Id. at 747.
58. Id. at 728–29, 748. However, the Court did maintain a possible exception for cost-plus
contracts. Id. at 735–36.
59. See Landes & Posner, Indirect Purchaser Standing, supra note 3, at 634–35
(“[S]ociety will be well-advised to allow some direct purchasers to enjoy windfalls if, as we
have argued, the direct-purchaser suit is on balance a more effective instrument for enforcing
the antitrust rule prohibiting price fixing than the indirect-purchaser suit.”); cf. Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 30 (1972) (arguing that the optimal tort
system should focus on achieving the optimal investment in safety, not on compensating victims
or eliminating accidents).
60. Lopatka & Page, supra note 5, at 539–40 (summarizing criticism of Illinois Brick by
consumer advocates). For an economic analysis showing how the rule of Illinois Brick can
actually extend and entrench cartels, see Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra & Jakob
Rüggeberg, Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion, 39
RAND J. ECON. 683 (2008).
61. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
62. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 733–34 n.14 (discussing the decision in light of the Hart–Scott–
Robino Act). For a recent discussion of parens patriae actions arguing that they share many of
the same problematic features as class actions, see Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation
Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012).
63. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 764 n.23.
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Soon after Illinois Brick, states began to pass so-called “Illinois
Brick repealers”—statutes aimed at repealing the rule of Illinois Brick
and reinstating indirect-purchaser suits.65 Additionally, some state
courts interpreted existing antitrust laws as allowing indirect-purchaser
suits, often despite explicit language stating that federal law should
guide state courts in interpreting state antitrust laws.66 In California v.
ARC America Corp.,67 the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether federal antitrust law preempted state repealer statutes68 and
held that it did not.69 The Court’s holding seemed to undermine the
rationale of Illinois Brick and embrace a wider view of standing without
overruling its previous decision.70 The Court stated that the repealer
statutes were “consistent with the broad purposes of the federal antitrust
laws: deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring the compensation
of victims of that conduct.”71
Despite whatever retreat from Illinois Brick might have momentarily
occurred in ARC America, the Court quickly reaffirmed and extended
the rule of Illinois Brick in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc.72 In that
decision, the Court denied standing to indirect purchasers from a
regulated utility company—a direct-purchaser entity with little incentive
to sue and a high likelihood of passing on the overcharge to indirectpurchasers—and instead limited standing to the utility company itself.73
B. Indirect-Purchaser Standing: Where Are We Now?
The Illinois Brick quartet—Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, ARC
American, and UtiliCorp—thus established a cumbersome and rigid
enforcement system—only direct purchasers can sue on a federal cause
of action for the entire overcharge, but indirect purchasers in certain
jurisdictions can also sue for the amount of overcharge passed on to
them.74 This system has led to the possibility of duplicative recovery
and has ensured duplicative litigation.75 Ironically, this rigid dual
system arose when the substantive law of antitrust began to coalesce
65. See Davis, supra note 21, at 391–95 (describing the history of Illinois Brick repealers).
66. See id. at 375–79 (detailing states that allowed indirect-purchaser class actions to
move forward despite the absence of statutes repealing Illinois Brick).
67. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
68. Id. at 100.
69. See id. at 105–06 (holding that state indirect-purchaser suits were not an obstacle to
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws).
70. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 617.
71. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 102.
72. 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
73. Id. at 204.
74. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 564–74.
75. See Donald I. Baker, Federalism and Futility: Hitting the Potholes on the Illinois
Brick Road, 17 ANTITRUST, no. 1, 2002, at 14, 15 (“That is the great irony of Illinois Brick—
where a conservative decision led to a populist political reaction that has produced duplicative
litigation and recoveries on a scale that the Supreme Court majority could scarcely have
imagined in the first place.”).
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around common, flexible standards based on federal law and
precedent.76
Further, in recent years, the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)77 has
lowered barriers to removing state-law class actions to federal court,
expanded the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts in these class
actions, and consequently lessened some of the disparities between state
and federal antitrust enforcement, often at the expense of indirect
purchasers.78 CAFA also increased the likelihood that courts will force
plaintiffs to pursue state antitrust claims in federal court, which has not
traditionally recognized their injuries.79 State-law claims brought in
federal court or removed to federal court are eligible for consolidation
as part of the multidistrict litigation (MDL) procedure.80 Thus, many
state-law indirect-purchaser claims now end up in federal court
alongside direct-purchaser class actions.81 Federal courts can
consolidate such class actions in MDL for pretrial motions and
discovery, but the transferee court cannot litigate the consolidated
claims.82 When indirect-purchaser class actions do arrive in federal
court, the federal courts have been reluctant to certify class actions
where plaintiffs sought recovery under different state substantive laws83
76. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 557–63 (describing the shift in
antitrust enforcement from 1975 to 1990).
77. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1453, 1711–15 (2012)).
78. CAFA loosens the removal requirements in suits based on diversity of citizenship in
four ways: (1) any defendant, including an in-state defendant, can remove; (2) any defendant
can remove even if not all defendants consent to removal; (3) no time limit exists for removal;
and (4) decisions to remand are reviewable. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 6:15. For a history of
the larger goals of CAFA and the aims of the Congress that passed it, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional
Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823 (2008).
79. See Bruce V. Spiva & Johnathan K. Tycko, Indirect Purchaser Litigation on Behalf of
Consumers After CAFA, 20 ANTITRUST, no. 1, 2005, at 12, 17 (“CAFA should now be read as a
mandate for federal courts to decide such [multistate] class actions, including indirect purchaser
class actions. The need to make decisions based on the laws of multiple states should no longer
be an accepted basis for a federal court to deny certification, if it ever were.”).
80. For a discussion of multidistrict litigation of indirect-purchaser suits, see INDIRECT
PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 211–23.
81. Lopatka & Page, supra note 5, at 534–35 (noting that plaintiffs often bring federal and
state claims side by side).
82. See INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 214–17. No similar
process exists for consolidating indirect-purchaser claims that are not removable. For a
discussion of strategies attorneys can use to coordinate across districts informally, see Joel M.
Cohen & Trisha Lawson, Navigating Multistate Indirect Purchaser Lawsuits, 15 ANTITRUST,
no. 3, 2001, at 29, 31–33.
83. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996) (“In a multistate class action, variations in state law may swamp any common issues and defeat
predominance.”); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012,
1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[C]ourts must respect these differences [in state law] rather than apply
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on the theory that such actions would undermine the common issues
within the class that must predominate to certify a class under
Rule 23(b)(3).84 However, such arguments against certification may
lose force once plaintiffs can no longer pursue their claims in state
court.85 The conflict between expanded jurisdiction over diversity class
actions in federal court and the increased focus on common questions
has left the status of indirect-purchaser class actions uncertain.86
II. THE LIMITED-FUND APPROACH
This Note proposes that antitrust class actions should be
conceptualized and litigated similar to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited-fund
class actions. Limited-fund class action treatment would be superior for
three reasons: (1) it would eliminate duplicative litigation by
consolidating all ongoing and future litigation in a single forum; (2) it
would improve enforcement by aligning plaintiffs’ incentives to litigate
at the liability stage and to seek the maximum recovery by creating
greater unity within the class; and (3) it would simplify damages
calculations between levels of the supply chain by distributing damages
according to a pro rata scheme.87 While designing optimal enforcement
procedures often requires balancing ease of administration and accuracy
of result,88 this Note argues that limited-fund class actions offer a better
one state’s law to sales in other states with different rules.”).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied
and if . . . the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members . . . .”).
85. For examples of both indirect- and direct-purchaser litigation going forward in federal
court, see generally In re: TFT–LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1179
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that direct and indirect purchasers stated a claim but dismissing
indirect-purchaser claims under certain state laws), and In re DDAVP Indirect Purchaser
Antitrust Litigation, 903 F. Supp. 2d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that plaintiffs stated claims
under various state laws but failed to state claims under the Clayton Act). See also Spiva &
Tycko, supra note 79, at 17 (“Previously, a federal court that denied certification on [the need to
make decisions under a variety of state laws] could plausibly argue that plaintiffs could take
their cases to their respective state courts. But a federal court that refuses to certify a class action
on those grounds now would effectively deny plaintiffs a remedy by denying them any viable
forum.”).
86. See generally D. Jarrett Arp, Be Careful What You Ask for: Unintended Consequences
and Unfinished Business Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 20 ANTITRUST, no. 1, 2005, at 8
(outlining the uncertain future of indirect-purchaser class actions).
87. A need to establish aggregate liability toward the class of purchasers as a whole will
always exist. However, the detailed analysis required to establish the precise level of damages
for individual purchasers—purchasing at different times, places, and different levels of the
supply chain—requires a great deal of resources but adds little or nothing in terms of deterrence
to would-be violators.
88. See Lande, Antitrust Damage Levels, supra note 54, at 332 (“We probably are better
off with even a complicated and flawed damages system that at least provides a moderate level
of deterrence, than with a simpler system that would lead to completely inadequate
deterrence.”). For a broader perspective of the American political system’s unique reliance on
private enforcement, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010).
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balance between these competing priorities. The following Sections
provide a brief history of limited-fund class actions and a summary of
the Court’s most important precedent in this area, Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp.,89 which established the guidelines for certifying Rule
23(b)(1)(B) classes.90
A. An Introduction to Limited-Fund Class Actions
Generally, limited-fund class action treatment requires two separate
inquiries: one into the existence of liability along with the total amount
that the defendants can or should pay plaintiffs, and a second into the
specific amounts of individual claims.91 In the first inquiry, plaintiffs’
interests are united as a class, while in the second they are adverse.92
Before certifying a limited-fund class action, the court must determine
whether the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 23(a),
including numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.93 Therefore, certification under a limited-fund theory
does not require that courts avoid scrutinizing certification decisions
89. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
90. See infra Section II.B.
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee’s notes (suggesting that courts should
certify “[a] class action by or against representative members to settle the validity of the claims
as a whole, or in groups, followed by separate proof of the amount of each valid claim and
proportionate distribution of the fund . . . .”); see, e.g., Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973,
978 (2d Cir. 1952) (certifying a class of seventy subscribers to a common stock fund who had
responded to a class-wide notice and appeared in court to divide a common fund of assets that
the court had certified at $176,254.24). Class action treatment pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) also
resembles interpleader under Rule 22 in that it provides a procedure for joining multiple parties
into one action when litigation moving forward without absent parties may impact their
interests. See FED. R. CIV. P. 22.
92. See generally RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4:16 (giving an overview of Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class actions).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). Generally, the existence of a common limited fund
satisfies Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement:
[I]mplicit in a finding that an action satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)
is a finding that the opposing party treated the class members in a common way
or that the issues underlying the class members’ claims are so intertwined that
adjudicating the claims of some would practically impair or bar the claims of
others (as in the case of a limited fund).
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 3:27. The adequacy of representation also plays an important role
in the litigation—although courts often address the issue in the context of a Rule 23(e) fairness
hearing—because a lack of representation for absent parties can defeat certification of a class or
a settlement when the absent parties’ interests are adverse to the settling parties’ interests, as is
often the case in a limited-fund class action. See, e.g., In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.,
982 F.2d 721, 741–43, 745 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing certification because of a lack of
subclasses for plaintiffs with adverse interests and opining that the same subclasses may not be
necessary in a (b)(3) class action).
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and the adequacy of plaintiffs’ theory to establish class-wide liability.
1. Unique Features of Limited-Fund Class Actions
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) permits the court to certify a class action when:
prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class
members would create a risk of . . . adjudications with
respect to individual class members that, as a practical
matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the individual adjudications or
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests.94
The Advisory Committee’s notes for this rule suggest that in limitedfund situations, the court should certify “[a] class action by or against
representative members to settle the validity of the claims as a whole, or
in groups, followed by separate proof of the amount of each valid claim
and proportionate distribution of the fund.”95
The final distribution of the aggregate fund is often done on a pro
rata basis to ensure fairness to all plaintiffs.96 Direct- and indirectpurchaser class actions implicitly share some characteristics with
limited-fund class actions—plaintiffs are united in seeking recovery but
divided over what portion of the recovery ought to accrue to each
plaintiff according to how much of the overcharge the direct purchaser
passed on to indirect purchasers.97 While actual harm in antitrust actions
differs from the total overcharge, the Supreme Court has traditionally
only recognized overcharge damages and has treated direct- and
indirect-purchaser class actions as a method of apportioning that total
overcharge.98
The limited-fund class action seems to require mandatory class
treatment, denying plaintiffs any right to opt out of the class.99
94. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B), with FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1) (“A
person . . . must be joined as a party if . . . that person claims an interest relating to the subject of
the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a
practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest . . . .”).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee’s notes.
96. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4:16 (“The [limited-fund] class action solves this
problem [of early claims being dispositive of later claims or impairing or impeding the claims]
by aggregating the claims together into one case and apportioning the available funds
proportionately among all the claimants.”).
97. Cf. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737–38 (1977) (discussing the possibility of
mandatory joinder of plaintiffs and the diversity of interests involved).
98. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 74 (“The Supreme Court thus assumed, first, that
the ‘overcharge’ was the proper method of damages for each successive firm in the distribution
chain; and, second, that measuring damages on down the line would require that the overcharge
be traced and ‘apportioned’ among different levels of claimants. In most cases both assumptions
are false.”).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A)–(B) (requiring notice for classes certified under Rule
23(b)(3) but stating that “[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court may
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Mandatory class treatment is necessary for Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class
actions to avoid the danger of plaintiffs opting out of the class to pursue
their own claims and thus exhausting the fund.100 Giving plaintiffs the
ability to opt out would destroy the purpose for certifying the original
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action.101 However, courts have occasionally
allowed plaintiffs to opt out of mandatory class actions under
Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2).102 Courts have also required subclasses for
different groups of plaintiffs whose claims may have a higher value or
who might otherwise prefer an alternative compensation structure.103
Additionally, the traditional limited-fund class action is unique in
that, after establishing liability, all of the plaintiffs’ interests become
adverse to one another because a larger recovery for one plaintiff means
a smaller recovery for all other plaintiffs.104 Reconciling the potentially
adverse interests of plaintiffs is one of the central challenges in
litigating limited-fund class actions. Plaintiffs who have stronger claims
(e.g., direct purchasers, purchasers with detailed records, or largevolume purchasers) can maximize the value of their recovery and limit
litigation expenses by pursuing individual litigation.105 However,
plaintiffs with smaller or negative value claims must pursue class action
treatment without the benefit of the plaintiffs with the strongest
claims.106 By splitting their efforts, neither the most valuable claims nor
direct appropriate notice to the class” (emphasis added)).
100. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4:16.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Richards-Cantave, 588 F.3d 790, 800 (2d Cir. 2009)
(allowing a Rule 23(b)(2) plaintiff who objected to the settlement to opt out and stating that
“[t]he right of a class member to opt-out in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions is not obvious on
the face of the rule; however, the language of Rule 23 is sufficiently flexible to afford district
courts discretion to grant opt-out rights in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4:1 (“[M]ost circuits permit a court
overseeing a class action to enable opt-out rights in (b)(1) . . . cases in certain
circumstances . . . .”).
103. For a discussion of the need for subclasses when plaintiffs’ claims have different
priority, see In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 725, 738–45 (2d Cir.
1992). For a discussion of the importance of subclasses when dealing with present and future
claims, see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999).
104. See, e.g., In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C.
2011) (noting that in a limited-fund class action “every award made to one claimant reduces the
amount of funds available to other claimants until, in the absence of equitable management of
the fund, some claimants are able to obtain full satisfaction of their claims, while others are left
with no recovery at all”). In the context of antitrust class actions, however, the conflicts would
exist mainly between subclasses of direct and indirect purchasers and not between every
plaintiff.
105. A large purchaser with an independently viable claim would likely increase its odds of
recovery and decrease the costs of litigation by avoiding the expense and uncertainty of class
actions.
106. For a discussion of the importance of mandatory participation in mass tort litigation
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the more numerous smaller-value claims can take full advantage of the
economies-of-scale necessary for successful aggregate litigation, and
duplicative litigation becomes more likely.107
2. Challenges of Litigating Limited-Fund Class Actions
Mandatory participation in a single litigation to establish liability for
the entire class is a high-stakes proposition.108 Divergent interests
between groups of plaintiffs—as well as between plaintiffs’ lawyers and
their clients—create the potential for collusive settlements.109 Thus,
courts must closely scrutinize any final settlement and provide adequate
notice to plaintiffs with the opportunity to object to any settlement.
Limited-fund class actions do not require notice to class members at the
certification stage, but notice—along with the opportunity to object—is
essential at the settlement stage to protect the interests of absent parties
whose recovery the defendant is attempting to limit.110 The court may
also provide notice before settlement, including notice of specific issues
germane to the class litigation.111 Additionally, due process may require
allowing absent plaintiffs to opt out in certain circumstances.112
and a criticism of opt-out rights as compounding the problem, see David Rosenberg,
Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV.
831, 833–35 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action]. But see
MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 135–37, 157–69 (2009) (emphasizing the importance of litigant
autonomy and questioning the necessity of mandatory participation). For an analysis of the
differing approaches to mandatory participation advanced by various scholars, see Mullenix,
supra note 11, at 188–200.
107. See Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action, supra note 106, at 847. This
explanation oversimplifies the problem somewhat, as some plaintiffs may not wish to sue at all
for principled reasons. However, this problem seems less profound in the context of antitrust
class actions where few people would be opposed to recovering damages from most
anticompetitive practices.
108. For a summary of some of the issues, see FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 22.73, at 421–24 (4th ed. 2004). For a discussion of the potential difficulties
inherent in litigating mandatory class actions, including conflicts of interest, and possible
remedies, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1461–65 (1995).
109. See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 815
(1997) (“The same mechanism of friendly settlements can be utilized to scuttle a legitimate class
action in one forum by the rapid certification and settlement of a class action in a different
forum.”).
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) (stating that when a party proposes a settlement, “[t]he court
must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the
proposal”). For the role of objectors in class actions, see Edward Brunet, Class Action
Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403.
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(B) (“In conducting an action under this rule, the court may
issue orders that . . . require—to protect class members and fairly conduct the action—giving
appropriate notice to some or all class members of: (i) any step in the action; (ii) the proposed
extent of the judgment; or (iii) the members’ opportunity to signify whether they consider the
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or to otherwise
come into the action . . . .”).
112. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.25 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence
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The next Section discusses Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,113 one of the
only Supreme Court decisions dealing with limited-fund class actions.
That decision set the framework for the responsibilities of federal courts
when certifying limited-fund class actions.114
B. The Ortiz Factors
The Supreme Court first addressed the requirements to certify a
limited-fund class action in the context of complex litigation in Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.115 The case involved the certification of a
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class of litigants previously exposed to the defendant’s
asbestos products.116 Prior to Ortiz, federal courts had used limited-fund
class actions in asbestos and other mass tort actions—tort claims
involving harm to numerous victims, sometimes spanning a wide
geographic area or extended time period—to try to facilitate the
settlement of large, complex litigation.117 Nevertheless, the Court had
expressed skepticism about an expansive use of class action settlements
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts118 and Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor,119 driven by concern over the potential for collusive
settlements between plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants as well as other
potential intra-class conflicts.120
Ortiz broadly addressed “the conditions for certifying a mandatory
settlement class on a limited fund theory under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(1)(B).”121 In reversing the decision to certify, the Court
examined past decisions that informed the drafting of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
and determined that a qualifying limited-fund class action must have
three characteristics: (1) “a ‘fund’ with a definitely ascertained limit,”
related to Rule 23(b)(1) class actions and the Due Process Clause).
113. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
114. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 108, § 22.73, at 422–23.
115. 527 U.S. at 821.
116. Id.
117. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 108, § 22.73, at 421 (providing
examples of courts certifying limited-fund class actions in mass torts). For an overview of
several high profile mass tort proceedings, as well as a critique of and suggestions for improving
mass tort class actions, see Coffee, Jr., supra note 108, and Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a
Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045,
2045 (2000). For a thorough overview and comparison of mass tort litigation as class actions and
in bankruptcy, see S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE STUDIES OF MASS TORT
LIMITED FUND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS & BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS (2000). For
specific information on asbestos litigation, see STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS
LITIGATION, at xxvii fig.S.1 (2005), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf.
118. See 472 U.S. 797, 810–12 (1985).
119. See 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997).
120. See, e.g., id. at 621 (citing Coffee, Jr., supra note 108, at 1379–80).
121. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821.
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(2) “all of which would be distributed to satisfy all those with liquidated
claims based on a common theory of liability,” (3) “by an equitable, pro
rata distribution.”122 The Court refused to certify the class because the
lower court did not create subclasses for plaintiffs with different
interests123 and because Fibreboard was able to retain most of its
value.124 The Court noted that previous limited-fund class actions
required subclasses for plaintiffs with different interests and that the
settlement in Ortiz exhausted all of that defendant’s assets.125
Ortiz severely limited the continuing viability of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
class actions in mass tort settlements.126 The decision required courts to
carefully scrutinize class action settlements and to even more carefully
consider potential conflicts of interest within the class.127 However, the
requirements established by Ortiz also helped clarify the purpose of
limited-fund class actions and identify situations in which these class
actions might remain viable.128 The following Part describes how
antitrust class actions could meet the Ortiz requirements for a limitedfund class action and identifies three important advantages to treating
antitrust class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
III. LIMITED-FUND CLASS ACTIONS APPLIED TO ANTITRUST CLAIMS
In antitrust direct- and indirect-purchaser class actions, it is the
amount of the total overcharge to direct purchasers rather than the
defendant’s total assets that limits damages.129 While the overcharge
method of determining antitrust damages inevitably understates the true
harm of price-fixing, the overcharge method provides an easy-to122. Id. at 838–39, 841 (discussing the characteristics of previous limited-fund actions,
which had formed the basis of the Advisory Committee’s experience with limited-fund class
actions).
123. Id. at 856–57.
124. Id. at 859. The Court did not decide whether the fact that Fibreboard retained some of
its value sufficed to deny certification. Id. However, the Court appeared particularly concerned
that tortfeasors could bargain their way out of substantial liability and force tort victims to
litigate their claims in complex arbitration proceedings and subject them to total caps without
the possibility of punitive damages. Id. at 859–60.
125. Id. at 864–65. The Court did not ultimately accept the argument that the possibility of
Fibreboard losing a pending appeal against its insurers, which would have left Fibreboard
unable to meet its tort obligations, was a substantial risk of a limited fund. See id. at 871–73
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
126. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 108, § 22.73, at 421 (“Ortiz put in
doubt the viability of limited-fund class actions in mass tort cases.”).
127. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864 (“Assuming, arguendo, that a mandatory, limited fund rationale
could under some circumstances be applied to a settlement class of tort claimants, it would be
essential . . . under Rules 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) that the class include all those with claims
unsatisfied at the time of the settlement negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by
recognizing independently represented subclasses.”).
128. See, e.g., Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1301, 1312–14, 1340–41 (11th Cir.
2012) (discussing the res judicata effects of a mass tort settlement class action).
129. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Basso & Ross, supra note 2, at
897.
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understand metric for establishing damages, which courts have
generally assumed to be the correct measure.130 Thus, an antitrust claim
meets Ortiz’s first requirement—a fund with an ascertainable limit131—
where a court finds that a method, usually total overcharge, exists for
estimating the total damages purchasers have suffered.132 The total
overcharge is clearly insufficient to meet the claims of all the direct and
indirect purchasers who are each suing for the total overcharge; direct
purchasers can argue that they absorbed the entire overcharge while
indirect purchasers can argue that direct purchasers passed on the entire
overcharge.133 An antitrust claim will also meet the second requirement
of Ortiz—common theory of liability134—where the direct and indirect
purchasers’ counsel coordinate to allege a common theory or theories of
competitive harm. The last requirement of Otiz—pro rata
distribution135—will require an equitable remedy and may provide a
more efficient way to distribute damages to purchasers.136
Litigating antitrust class actions as limited-fund class actions
presents three distinct advantages: (1) it eliminates duplicative litigation
and reduces the risk of duplicative recovery; (2) it improves
enforcement by aligning plaintiffs’ incentives to litigate at the liability
stage and seeks the maximum recovery by creating greater unity within
the class; and (3) it simplifies damages calculations between levels of
the supply chain by distributing damages according to a pro rata
scheme. The following Sections discuss each of these advantages in
turn.

130. For a discussion of the issues around computing damages and the problems with
assuming that overcharge damages are a correct measure of harm to retailers and consumers, see
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 68–76.
131. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 841.
132. Federal courts have previously certified limited-fund classes in situations where
damages were limited by statute or regulation. See, e.g., In re Black Farmers Discrimination
Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (certifying a class of black farmers based on the
existence of a limited fund for damages established by Congress to encourage settlement); Stott
v. Capital Fin. Servs., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 316, 336, 347 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (certifying a limited fund
based on a determination that defendant had to retain certain minimum amounts of capital in
order to comply with securities regulations). But see In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 140 (2d
Cir. 2005) (refusing to certify a class of smokers based on constitutional caps on punitive
damages because any such cap was too speculative).
133. This sort of inherent conflict between the parties regarding the appropriate division of
a limited recovery forms the core of a limited-fund class action. See supra notes 91–114 and
accompanying text.
134. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 841.
135. Id.
136. See infra Section III.C.
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A. Eliminate Duplicative Litigation
Perhaps the most obvious and easily understood advantage to
consolidating litigation is the savings that result from not duplicating
many issues related to the litigation.137 While CAFA has resulted in
more indirect-purchaser litigation arriving in federal court where parties
can consolidate it for pretrial matters, a significant amount of indirectpurchaser litigation still remains in state courts.138 Additionally, CAFA
applies only to class actions and not to lawsuits by large numbers of
indirect purchasers proceeding independently,139 whereas limited-fund
class actions stay all other pending litigation.140 Finally, the MDL
procedure only consolidates litigation for pretrial matters, not for the
actual litigation.141 Limited-fund class actions consolidate all pending
litigation by class members to determine liability and distribute
funds.142 Reducing duplicative litigation will also improve enforcement
by allowing the legal system to litigate more distinct cases rather than
concentrating resources on a few cases. Additionally, litigating antitrust
claims in a single forum will reduce the need to entertain various
duplicative causes of action and legal theories targeting the same
allegedly anticompetitive conduct.143 Although conflict-of-laws issues
are important to the final disposition of claims, courts better handle
137. For the wide variety of complex and resource-intensive issues that may arise in
antitrust litigation, see generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 108, §§ 30–
30.4.
138. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 272 (approving of
alternative methods to consolidate litigation such as MDL and the changes brought by CAFA
but noting that ultimately these methods are insufficient). Two commissioners dissented from
the Committee’s recommendation to provide indirect-purchasers standing and consolidate
litigation in a single forum in part because they believed CAFA would substantially ameliorate
the problem of indirect-purchaser litigation. Id. at 270. See also Robert H. Lande, New Options
for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61
ALA. L. REV. 447, 448–49 & n.11 (2010) [hereinafter Lande, New Options] (noting the billions
of dollars recovered in state indirect-purchaser litigation, including recent settlements in vitamin
litigation).
139. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 272.
140. Courts have the authority to stay ongoing litigation under the All-Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law.”). For an example of a court exercising its authority to stay
ongoing arbitration in a limited-fund context, see Stott v. Capital Fin. Servs., Inc., 277 F.R.D.
316, 347 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
141. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998)
(barring MDL courts from “self-assigning” venue for the purpose of trial).
142. See supra notes 87–112 and accompanying text.
143. For a discussion of choice-of-law issues in MDL, see INDIRECT PURCHASER
LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 83–92 (noting variations in “damage and remedy
provisions; whether the pass-on defense is recognized; whether the state’s law applies only to
predominately intrastate activity; different statutes of limitations and standing provisions; and
whether the state law protects defendants against multiple liability to direct and indirect
purchasers” (footnotes omitted)).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/17

22

Carr: Reconsidering Indirect-Purchaser Class Actions

2015]

RECONSIDERING INDIRECT-PURCHASER CLASS ACTIONS

935

them through subclasses and procedural motions or hearings, and these
claims rarely raise issues necessitating separate trials.
B. Improved Enforcement
Less intuitive, but also significant, is the importance of a single class
action to increase the incentives for all the parties to the litigation,
including the courts, to maximize their investment in the litigation.144
The current multi-district and multi-jurisdictional approach to litigating
antitrust class actions limits the parties’ incentives to invest heavily in
discovery, expert witnesses, and other litigation resources.145 Parties
invest in litigation resources up to the point of negative marginal return
on their investments—the point where investing additional time, money,
and effort ceases to produce more benefits than costs.146 Litigation
involving fewer claims will reach this point more quickly because the
maximum potential recovery from resolving fewer claims is less than
the maximum potential recovery from resolving more claims.147 This is
true for all parties to the litigation. Plaintiffs in larger class actions have
the potential for a larger recovery, but defendants also have the
opportunity to defeat more claims, and judges have the possibility of
adjudicating more claims.148 While alternative procedures like claim
and issue preclusion attempt to provide similar incentives for both sides
to invest heavily in litigation, they do not provide the same certainty as
consolidated litigation; thus they make parties hesitant to invest more
resources when the preclusive effects of a particular judgment are
unknown.149
Historically, private parties have constituted approximately 95% of
antitrust plaintiffs,150 making private litigation essential to the current
enforcement regime. One of the major criticisms of the rule of Illinois
Brick is that it removed an entire class of potential antitrust enforcers
and provided cartels with the ability to insulate themselves from
liability by sharing their supracompetitive profits with direct

144. Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action, supra note 106, at 848 (arguing that
class action treatment provides economies of scale in litigation and encourages optimal
investment).
145. Id. at 848–49.
146. Id. at 848.
147. Id. at 848–49.
148. Id. at 849, 851, 853 (describing the importance of optimal incentives for courts to
reach the optimal investment in judicial resources).
149. Id. at 849.
150. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 58 & n.4. For the most recent statistics, see U.S.
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Dec. 30, 2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2013/december/
C02Dec13.pdf.
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purchasers.151 Therefore, providing better incentives to litigate a variety
of cases should produce better outcomes such as more accurate results
and more comprehensive enforcement.
C. Pro Rata Distribution
The Supreme Court has required pro rata distribution for Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class actions.152 Professor Andrew I. Gavil has proposed a
similar approach to indirect-purchaser damages based on a schedule of
distribution.153 Using a pro rata scheme offers several benefits over
calculating the amount of overcharge that direct purchasers passed on, a
complex and often inconclusive inquiry.154 First, a pro rata system for
allocating the overcharge would simplify the damages inquiry and
eliminate the need to perform complex calculations of the amount of
overcharge passed on.155
Second, a pro rata system would preserve the incentives for all
parties along the supply chain to sue because each purchaser would be
sure to receive a portion of three times the total overcharge due to the
Clayton Act’s treble damages provision.156 Without a pro rata system of
recovery, direct purchasers, who likely have greater resources than
indirect purchasers, might take advantage of the damage-allocation
phase of litigation to claim a greater share of damages than they actually
suffered. A pro rata scheme would ensure that all parties have the
possibility of a significant recovery and eliminate the possibility of
losing recovery to another group of purchasers.157
Third, a pro rata scheme would ensure the unity of plaintiffs’
interests in pursuing maximum recovery from the defendant.158 In
contrast, a scheme that awards damages in proportion to actual harm
might facilitate free-rider problems because parties with weaker claims
could wait until liability is proven in the first stage of litigation and then

151. See Schinkel, Tuinstra & Rüggeberg, supra note 60, at 685 (discussing how “direct
purchasers benefit with the cartel members at the expense of the rest of the chain of production
and final consumers”).
152. See supra notes 115–128 and accompanying text.
153. Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 195. Professor Robert H. Lande also
discussed the merits of pro rata distribution, among other possible mechanisms, for distributing
the overcharge among indirect purchasers. See Lande, New Options, supra note 138, at 475–84.
The State of Nevada already authorizes pro rata distribution in parens patriae suits. NEV. REV.
STAT. § 598A.160(2) (2013).
154. For a discussion of the many practical difficulties of proving pass-on, see Deng,
Johnson & Leonard, supra note 30. Alternative methods for calculating damages other than
focusing on the overcharge exist, e.g., the “yardstick” method and the “before-and-after”
method. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 74.
155. Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 195.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 196.
158. Id.
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invest heavily in showing their own damages in the second stage.159 By
establishing ex ante the percentage of any recovery for which a class of
plaintiffs will be eligible, pro rata recovery unites plaintiffs’ interests in
pursuing the maximum possible recovery. Pro rata recovery ensures that
each party to the litigation will benefit from prevailing on the issue of
liability or increasing the total amount of liability.160 However, a
protracted damages inquiry would needlessly delay final recovery in a
situation where litigation has likely already dragged on over a
considerable period of time.161
Fourth, a pro rata scheme would facilitate negotiations by
clarifying the rights of the various plaintiff classes to the total
overcharge.162 Plaintiffs would bargain in the shadow of an
established remedial scheme and without inherent intra-class
conflict.163 Settlement in the context of mass tort class actions has
often fallen apart because of the adverse interests of different
subclasses of plaintiffs.164 An ex ante scheme for distributing
overcharge damages would solve this problem and make settlement
more feasible.165
Finally, a pro rata scheme would facilitate class certification and
simplify conflicts within the class.166 While CAFA has facilitated the
removal of indirect-purchaser litigation to federal court, federal courts
have often refused to certify such class actions because the courts find
that individual issues, such as the amount of overcharge passed on, tend
to predominate.167 Limited-fund class actions do not have the same
predominance requirement because of their focus on litigating the
liability issue and eliminating complex individual issues related to
159. Rosenberg, Regulatory Advantage, supra note 11, at 263. This free-rider problem
mirrors many of the current difficulties facing class actions in general. By litigating
individually, parties lose the potential benefits of pooled resources, and they drive up litigation
costs by needlessly duplicating their efforts. See id. at 263–65.
160. Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 196.
161. See Lande, New Options, supra note 138, at 458 n.52 (noting that some evidence
suggests the average cartel lasts seven to eight years and litigation requires another four to five
years).
162. Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 196 (discussing additional benefits of
pro rata distribution for settlement negotiation between different purchaser levels).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864–65 (1999) (refusing to certify a
settlement class action in part because parties with adverse interests were not represented during
negotiations).
165. Courts would still limit the plaintiffs participating in the negotiations as indirect
purchasers to those from jurisdictions that grant such purchasers standing to sue.
166. Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 196.
167. Lopatka & Page, supra note 5, at 535 (noting that individual issues tend to
predominate in indirect-purchaser litigation and that these suits rarely offer indirect purchasers
much in the way of meaningful compensation).
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calculating actual damages.168 By determining proper distribution ex
ante, the courts can focus their efforts on issues of procedural law, the
defendant’s liability, and the amount of the overcharge, and thereby
reduce the amount of resources wasted on subjective determinations of
predominance and common proof, which, unfortunately, often
overwhelm class action litigation.169
CONCLUSION
This Note began with the observation that antitrust violations affect
every one of us.170 From this observation flow two conclusions: (1)
antitrust enforcement will never compensate all of the victims of
competitive harm, and (2) collective-action problems will always
undermine enforcement because no individual plaintiff is likely to suffer
the full force of antitrust injury so that some amount of procedural
intervention will be necessary to ensure robust enforcement.171 This
Note’s approach attempts to limit these two difficulties by aligning the
interests of the victims of anticompetitive behavior and empowering
them to pursue their claims as a unified class. While this approach
sacrifices some litigant autonomy and disavows any claims to actual
compensation, it could significantly strengthen enforcement capabilities
and eliminate duplicative litigation. It is unclear whether federal courts
are willing to consolidate antitrust litigation in a single forum,
especially when it means preempting ongoing state litigation.172 The
MDL procedure, however, offers an intriguing model. This Note
suggests adapting existing procedures—Rule 23(b)(1)(B)—to meet the
changing needs of modern class-action litigation. Private enforcement to
achieve public policy goals has long been an essential component of the
168. See supra notes 91–114 and accompanying text.
169. See Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 196 (noting the perverse incentives
for plaintiffs’ lawyers to file multiple claims across multiple jurisdictions and for defense
lawyers to exploit fears of pass-on to demand even greater requirements before certification);
see also Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action, supra note 106, at 851–52 (noting the
free-rider incentives for courts to rely on precedent, stare decisis, estoppel, and incorporation by
reference to avoid meaningful engagement and analysis of the issues presented in complex
litigation).
170. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
171. Alternatively, public entities such as state attorneys general, the U.S. Department of
Justice, or the Federal Trade Commission could have the exclusive or primary power to sue. For
a variety of reasons, enforcement in the United States has relied heavily on private parties and
resisted providing broad power and resources to government enforcers. See generally FARHANG,
supra note 88, at 16 (arguing “that legislative-executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy
drives Congress to rely upon litigants and courts as an alternative to administrative power”).
172. Most state antitrust litigation is based largely and explicitly on federal precedents. See
Davis, supra note 21, at 375–79 (discussing examples of state law based on federal precedents
but differing on issues of indirect-purchaser standing). Therefore, federalism concerns—taking
authority away from state lawmakers and courts—seem relatively minor because almost all the
states have expressed little interest in developing unique antitrust rules, except, ironically, when
it comes to the issue of indirect-purchaser causes of action. Id.
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American legal system. Future reform should focus on building on
existing structures to better meet public policy goals.
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